Open Season Declared on Automobile Searches by Kelly, Susan E.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 18 
Number 1 Fall 1983 pp.167-192 
Fall 1983 
Open Season Declared on Automobile Searches 
Susan E. Kelly 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Susan E. Kelly, Open Season Declared on Automobile Searches, 18 Val. U. L. Rev. 167 (1983). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss1/5 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
OPEN SEASON DECLARED ON AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution1 is to protect individuals2 from arbitrary and oppressive
official conduct which invades their privacy.' It is well recognized that
no right is more sacred than an individual's right to possess and con-
trol his own person, free from all interference except by unques-
tionable authority of law.' In order to protect an individual's expecta-
tion of privacy, the fourth amendment imposes a standard of
reasonableness upon law enforcement officials in handling, searches
and seizures.5 When there is an intrusion upon a person's privacy by
a government official to which the individual objects, the court
balances the public and private interests involved in order to deter-
mine what is reasonable under the circumstances.' Thus, the fourth
amendment protects the individual's expectations of privacy by re-
quiring searches and seizures to be reasonable.
Underlying the fourth amendment is the fundamental constitu-
tional rule that warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable."7 This
1. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. The fourth amendment protects people and the places for which they har-
bor reasonable expectations of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
3. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (fourth amendment "pro-
tects people from unreasonable government intrusion into their legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy"), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The overriding
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State." The fourth amendment is to protect against ar-
bitrary intrusions upon privacy.)
4. "No right is held more sacred, or is -more carefully guarded, by common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own per-
son, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law." Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
5. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (A person in an
automobile does not lose all reasonable expectations of privacy.); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) (warrant must be obtained whenever practical because fourth amend-
ment protects privacy interests in street as well as home).
6. See, e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967) (unconsented warrantless search of private property unreasonable).
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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rule is "subject only to a few specifically established and well
delineated exceptions."' These exceptions are to be carefully construed9
through a liberal interpretation of the protection the fourth amend-
ment provides against unreasonable searches and seizures. 10 In addi-
tion, in order to invoke an exception to the warrant requirement, the
government must show that the exigencies of the situation render
a warrantless search imperative.1" Only where the circumstances of
a search and seizure are exigent is a warrantless search valid under
the carefully construed exceptions to the fourth amendment.
Since the fourth amendment's ratification, 3 disagreement over
its proper construction and application continues to result in a con-
siderable amount of interpretative litigation. 4 However, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the amendment has led to "something less
than a seamless web"'" in which the Court itself has become
8. Id- "[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior ap-
proval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id. The
Court refers here to exceptions such as the automobile and search incident to arrest
exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. There are additional ex-
ceptions to the fourth amendment. Id. See generally, W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 214-473 (1978). This note is limited to an evalua-
tion of the automobile exception to the fourth amendment. See infra note 30.
9. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 502 (1958) (Abuses of these excep-
tions would lead to the type of warrantless searches the fourth amendment was writ-
ten to prevent.).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (warrantless search
of office for illegal liquor held unreasonable); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932)
(search held unreasonable when officers broke into garage and seized whiskey without
a warrant); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1921) (search conducted under
a valid search warrant not unreasonable in light of liberal construction of fourth
amendment).
11. Under the automobile exception, the government must show that the cir-
cumstances require immediate action without the delay of obtaining a warrant. The
purpose of allowing warrantless searches under exigent circumstances is to prevent
the loss of evidence. Therefore, when there is a danger of losing evidence within an
automobile because the vehicle may be moved before it is possible to obtain a war-
rant, a warrantless search is reasonable. See, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
12. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (those who wish to
be exempt from the constitutional requirement for a warrant must show that "the
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative".)
13. The fourth amendment was ratified on December 15, 1791.
14. The Court recognized as Justice Powell observed in Robbins v. Califor-
nia, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2848 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982),
that there has been an overwhelming number of cases in the area of search and seizure
law. In order to clarify the confusion surrounding the interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment it granted certiorari in United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1982).
15. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.).
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entangled." Diverse interpretations of the amendment are particularly
apparent in the area of vehicle searches. 7 Since criminal trials fre-
quently involve searches and seizures, it is imperative that the law
in this area be clear." Yet, because courts frequently view minor dif-
ferences in factual circumstances as controlling when determining
fourth amendment rights," application of search and seizure law with
respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing.2' As a result, the
Supreme Court seeks to clarify the standards and objectives it uses
in determining what elements the fourth amendment requires in a
valid automobile search.
In determining the requisite elements of a valid warrantless
automobile search under the fourth amendment, the Court weighs many
variables including exigency,21 reasonable expectations of privacy,22
16. Justice Powell has pointed out that "the Court apparently cannot agree
even on what it has held previously, let alone on how these cases should be decided."
Robbins, 101 S. Ct. at 2841.
17. See supra n6tes 15-16.
18. Justice Frankfurter discussed the need for clarity in the area of automobile
search and seizure law in the following passage:
Since searches and seizures play such a frequent role in federal criminal
trials, it is most important that the law on searches and seizures by which
prosecutors and trial judges are to be guided should be as clear and un-
confusing as the nature of the subject matter permits. The course of true
law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not-to
put it mildly-run smooth.
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In
addition, it is more probable that a search or seizure will be valid if the officials in-
volved clearly understand the law of search and seizure. Convictions are more likely
where all possible evidence is admissible at trial. Thus, clear rules governing the law
on searches and seizures help to prevent the release of a criminal on technicalities
alone. See, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
19. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 757.
20. See supra note 14.
21. See, e.g., Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (warrantless search conducted after seizure
of luggage invalid); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (warrantless search
of automobile two weeks after probable cause to search became apparent unreasonable);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of automobile impounded
at stationhouse valid); Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (warrantless search of automobile substan-
tial distance from neutral magistrate valid).
22. See, e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (individual associated with automobile does
not lose all fourth amendment protection of reasonable expectations of privacy simply
because automobile subject to government regulation); Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (legitimate
privacy interests in luggage seized from automobile protected by fourth amendment);
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) ("One has a lesser expectation of privacy
in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects."); Cady, 413 U.S. at 442 (because
extensive police contact with automobiles there is lesser expectation of privacy
associated with them).
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preservation of evidence, 3 and an underlying goal of ease in applying
the amendment at the time of the search.24 In balancing these interests,
courts have created a diverse body of case law which lacks clarity. 5
The inconsistency has led to increased litigation in an effort to remedy
the situation.' As a result, the Court's most recent decision, United
States v. Ross,' reflects an effort to create distinct rules that make
conducting automobile searches less difficult." But in achieving clear
rules, the Court appears to ignore basic fourth amendment principles.'
This note explores the basic fourth amendment principles the
Supreme Court ignores in regard to automobile searches under the
automobile exception.' Evaluation of the Supreme Court's considera-
tion of fourth amendment principles in the past reveals inconsistent
and drastic applications in the area of automobile exception searches."1
In an effort to achieve clear rules governing automobile exception
searches, the Court allows a warrantless search even when conducted
after the justifications for the search have dissipated. 2 In addition,
the Court assumes that a lesser expectation of privacy is inherent
in automobiles and in some containers within automobiles regardless
of the circumstances surrounding a particular automobile search.' This
conclusion ignores the fourth amendment protection afforded to
privacy interests in personal effects. Therefore, in light of the confu-
sion created by the Court's holdings in this area, ' an alternative to
the present system of automobile exception searches must be con-
sidered. The solution proposed here preserves the well established
23. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, reh. denied, 404 U.S.
874 (1971); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (warrantless search of automobile
reasonable because could have been moved before warrant obtained) Carroll, 267 U.S.
132 (warrantless search of automobile valid because not practical to obtain warrant
before vehicle could be moved out of reach of officials).
24. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157; Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.
25. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
26. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157; Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.
27. 102 S. Ct. 2157.
28. Id.
29. In his dissent, Justice Marshall notes the Court's failure to address basic
fourth amendment principles. Id., at 2173-82.
30. The automobile exception to the fourth amendment renders valid a war-
rantless search of an automobile under special circumstances. First, there must be
probable cause to search the automobile. Second, the circumstances must be exigent.
If there two requirements are present, the warrantless search is valid. Carroll, 267
U.S. at 149.
31. See infra notes 66-173 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 55-95 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 96-173 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
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fourth amendment principle protecting reasonable expectations of
privacy.
In order to protect reasonable expectations of privacy, the solu-
tion this note proposes requires that a warrant be obtained prior
to conducting an automobile search. 5 A warrantless search is accept-
able only where the individual makes a voluntary and intelligent
waiver of his fourth amendment rights or where exigent circumstances
exist. Absent these circumstances, the police officer must obtain a
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.
In support of this alternative to warrantless searches, the pre-
sent system of automobile searches under the automobile exception
to the fourth amendment is evaluated. Initially this note discusses
why the Court requires detached and neutral magistrates to issue
warrants." Then, through an assessment of the Court's view of the
exigency requirement, it is shown that the Court is willing to find
automobile exception searches valid even though the actual cir-
cumstances of the search are not exigent.' Since the present system
of automobile exception searches disregards well established fourth
amendment principles, an easily applicable rule is offered to replace
it. The solution proposed maintains the protection the fourth amend-
ment gives to individuals, a reasonable expectation of privacy, by
strictly construing the exigency requirement.
FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT OF A NEUTRAL MAGISTRATE
The Supreme Court has determined that individual freedoms,
such as those protected by the fourth amendment, are best served
by the basic constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and a divi-
sion of functions among the branches of government. 8 As a result,
the fourth amendment requires that warrants 9 be issued by neutral
35. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text. Throughout this note it
is assumed that probable cause has been established prior to discussing the requirements
of exigent circumstances and protection given to reasonable expectations of privacy.
For a discussion of probable cause, see infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 55-95 and accompanying text.
38. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
39. A warrant is an order by a neutral magistrate, directed to a peace officer
commanding him to search and bring before the court specific property illegally held
by someone. The warrant must describe the particular place to be searched and the
specific property to be seized. A warrant may be issued only upon probable cause
to believe evidence of illegal activity is present. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
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and detached magistrates." The detached scrutiny of a neutral
magistrate provides independent assurance that a search will not com-
mence without the requisite probable cause."
The requirement of probable cause to search an automobile is
satisfied when the facts and circumstances prior to the search are
sufficient to warrant a prudent man to believe the vehicle contains
crime-connected materials." If a reasonable man would believe that
40. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (As a general rule, the
reasonableness of a search or seizure must be decided by a neutral magistrate rather
than an officer or government agent.); McDonald, 335 U.S. 451 (informed and deliberate
determinations of magistrates issuing warrants preferred over hurried judgment of
officers). This note uses the word "magistrate" to refer generally to those within the
judicial system who are considered capable of determining probable cause. See, e.g.,
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972) (court clerk); United States v.
Haywood, 464 F.2d 756 (1972) (justice of the peace).
41. Warrantless searches must be reasonable under the fourth amendment.
See, e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54; Terry, 392 U.S. at 2-3. Since the requirements
of a valid warrantless search or seizure "surely cannot be less stringent," Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963), than the requirements when a warrant is
procured, the fourth amendment requires probable cause to be established prior to
a valid warrantless search or seizure. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
Thus, the government must establish that probable cause existed prior to a warrantless
search.
When police conduct a warrantless search, the basis for probable cause is deter-
mined through the officer's testimony on the motion to suppress the evidence obtained
in the search. J. ISRAEL AND W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS 112 (1980). There is a danger that the facts presented at the suppression hearing
will not be limited to those known to the officer prior to the warrantless search or
seizure. In contrast, when a warrant is obtained prior to a search or seizure, the facts
constituting the basis for a determination that probable cause exists are recorded in
a complaint or affidavit. This record is presented at the suppression hearing and the
court determines if the facts within the record are sufficient to establish probable
cause. Thus, when probable cause is established by a magistrate, there is a record
of the facts on which it was based. Id.
Probable cause may be established based on facts that would not be admissi-
ble as evidence in a trial. See, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-74 (1949).
Thus, "[Iln dealing with probable cause .... as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considera-
tions of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act." Id. Thus, if the facts are such that a reasonable man would believe that a crime
has occurred, there is a sufficient basis for determining that probable cause to search
exists. For a more extensive discussion of probable cause, see, W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 436-704 (1978).
42. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (no factual basis upon which to base prob-
able cause to arrest, therefore, the subsequent search unreasonable); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (no factual basis to establish probable cause to arrest or
search); Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160 (probable cause to search automobile for illegal liquor
established prior to warrantless search).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1983], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss1/5
1983] AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
the automobile contains "crime-connected materials,"43 the magistrate
will authorize a warrant to search the automobile." The issuing
magistrate must be neutral, detached, and capable of determining
whether probable cause exists for issuing a warrant. By requiring
this independent evaluation of probable cause, the fourth amendment
provides a reliable safeguard against improper searches conducted by
"well intentioned but mistakenly overzealous"46 agents of the law en-
forcement system engaged in the "often competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime."4 To assume that a police officer's hurried judg-
ment that probable cause exists at the scene,48 is equal to that of a
magistrate's disinterested determination is to reduce the fourth amend-
ment to a nullity.49 Thus, absent some "grave emergency,"50 a war-
rant is constitutionally required.
The purpose of the warrant requirement is to protect an in-
43. The phrase "crime connected materials" is a term of art in the area of
criminal law. It is used to replace the reference to the word "contraband" because
the term "contraband" does not encompass all evidence associated with a crime. Thus,
the phrase "crime connected materials" more accurately describes the objects searched
for in an automobile search.
44. Beck, 379 U.S. 89; Henry, 361 U.S. 98; Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160.
45. Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 350.
46. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 304.
47. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14. In Johnson, the Court discussed the value of
a neutral magistrate:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection con-
sists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id.
48. The Court discussed the preference for a warrant in Lejkowitz, 285 U.S.
at 464:
Indeed, the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates im-
powered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible
under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of of-
ficers and others who may happen to make arrests. Security against
unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search war-
rants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers
while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons
accused of crime.
49. The Court was speaking of the search of a home here. But, it stated that
this ruling applies to all searches except under exceptional circumstances. Johnson,
333 U.S. at 13-14.
50. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455-56. See also infra notes 55-95 and accompany-
ing text.
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dividual's privacy against unreasonable intrusions." Historically,
searches are less likely to exceed proper bounds when conducted pur-
suant to a valid warrant.5 2 Therefore, the right to privacy is best pro-
tected when an objective mind weighs the need to invade that privacy
for law enforcement purposes.' To best achieve protection of an in-
dividual's privacy rights while maintaining law and order, police should
be strongly encouraged to seek warrants from detached and neutral
magistrates prior to conducting searches.'
AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION SEARCHES
The Supreme Court has long recognized exceptions to the re-
quirement of a neutral magistrate's issuance of a warrant in excep-
tional circumstances. Specifically, the Court recognized the automobile
exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement in Carroll
v. United States."5 Under this exception, automobiles may be searched
without a warrant if two conditions are met.' First, there must be
probable cause to believe evidence subject to search, seizure, and
destruction is located in the car.57 Second, there must be exigent cir-
cumstances rendering a warrant impractical.' The Court stated that
if exigent circumstances render obtaining a warrant for an automobile
51. It has been suggested that the warrant requirement makes it less dif-
ficult for criminals to conduct illegal activity. However, the Supreme Court has noted
that it is not intended to protect criminals or make homes safe places for criminal
activity. Instead, the purpose is to protect reasonable expectations of privacy. McDonald,
335 U.S. at 455-56.
52. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 9. ("Once a lawful search has begun, it is also far
more likely that it will not exceed proper bounds when it is done pursuant to a judicial
authorization . . .")
53. Id.
54. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111-12 (1965).
55. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In this landmark case, the officers had probable cause
to believe the defendants were transporting alcohol illegally. Officers stopped the defen-
dants' automobile on a highway 16 miles from Detroit, Michigan. A warrantless search
of the car, which included tearing open the upholstery of the seats, was conducted
at the location. The search revealed 68 bottles of whiskey. Admission of this evidence
at trial led to a conviction under the Prohibition Act. Id. at 134-36.
56. Id. at 149.
57. Id. The Court made it clear that it was not basing its decision on the
validity of the arrest of the defendants. Thus, a clear distinction was made between
this automobile exception case and cases involving searches incident to lawful arrest. Id.
58. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132. The Carroll case involved a statute permitting
searches of automobiles for the purpose of enforcing the Prohibition Act. The impor-
tant question as to whether a statute is required upon which to base a valid war-
rantless search remains unclear after the Carroll opinion.
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search impractical, a warrantless search is reasonable,59 and therefore
valid.60
A warrant must be used where it is reasonably practical to ob-
tain one. 1 Only where it is not practical to obtain a warrant because
the goods can be put readily out of the reach of a search warrant
(as in vehicles that can be quickly moved), are warrantless searches
constitutional.2 Thus, the Carroll rule preserves the fourth amend-
ment requirement that a warrantless search be reasonable and based
upon probable cause.
The Court felt that its conclusion was in keeping with fourth
amendment principles and would be easily and uniformly applied. 3
However, from what the Court believed to be a clear rule came much
litigation concerning the elements of exigent circumstances." The deci-
sions involving application of the automobile exception's exigency re-




The automobile exception is premised on the theory that the in-
herent mobility of an automobile creates exigent circumstances that
make it impractical for officers to obtain a warrant prior to a search."
The exigency requirement must be based only on the strongest possi-
ble emergency. 7 In Carroll, the primary justification for the war-
rantless automobile search was the potential mobility of the
59. Id. at 153, 156.
60. "The fourth amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but
only such as are unreasonable." Id. at 147.
61. Id. at 156.
62. Id. at 151.
63. Id. at 159. Note, that the only fourth amendment principles discussed by
the Carroll Court were the reasonableness of the search and the newly introduced
idea of exigent circumstances surrounding the search.
64. Unfortunately, the Carroll decision left questions unanswered. Are per-
mitting statutes necessary for a valid search? Must the automobile be in motion im-
mediately prior to the search? Does the exception apply to moveable containers within
the automobile? See supra notes 10-16.
65. See supra notes 10-16.
66. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.
67. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (smell of opium.
eminating from room did not create exigent circumstances for warrantless search);
McDonald, 335 U.S. 451 (detecting sound of adding machine outside lottery room did
not make a warrantless search imperative).
1983]
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automobile. 8 It was possible for the car to be moved before the of-
ficers were able to secure a warrant. 9 Thus, the circumstances were
exigent because the automobile could be placed beyond the reach of
a search warrant.
7 0
In a subsequent Supreme Court case,71 the Court did not require
a warrant to search an automobile that was parked and unattended
prior to the search even though the officers had ample time to pro-
cure the warrant.7 2 Since this search was valid, it appears that the
Court's interpretation of Carroll does not require that the automobile
be in motion immediately prior to the search. 7 Therefore, the Carroll
doctrine applies to stationary vehicles.
The Court in Chambers v. Maroney74 contributed greatly to the
confusion surrounding the exigency requirement by applying the Car-
roll doctrine to a stationary vehicle which was in police custody at
the time of the search.7 A search conducted after the automobile was
seized on the street and subsequently impounded at police head-
quarters was held constitutional under the Carroll rationale.7 ' The
Court concluded that if probable cause to search exists at the time
an automobile is stopped, it continues to exist and justifies a later
search upon the automobile reaching the police station.7 7 The defen-
68. Immediately prior to the search the car was moving. Carroll, 267 U.S.
at 135-36.
69. Id. at 153.
70. Id.
71. Husty, 282 U.S. 694.
72. In Husty, the automobile was unattended when located by police. The of-
ficers waited for Husty to return to the car and at that time conducted the search.
Id. at 700-01.
73. Although the occupants of the car attempted escape, the Supreme Court
did not apply these facts to its determination that exigent circumstances existed. Rather,
the Court applied these facts to establish probable cause. Therefore, the exigency re-
quirement appears to have been based solely on the fact that the search was of an
automobile, which is inherently mobile. Id. at 701.
74. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
75. The Court stated:
[O]n the facts before us, the blue station wagon could have been searched
on the spot when it was stopped since there was probable cause to search
and it was a fleeting target for a search. The probable-cause factor still
obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless
the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the
denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured.
Id. at 52; See also infra note 178.
76. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48-51.
77. Id. at 52.
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dant in Chambers was in police custody and had no access to the
automobile."8 There was no danger that the vehicle would be moved"9
as there was in Carroll where the defendants had access to the
automobile.0 Therefore, the Chambers Court relied on the inherent
mobility of the automobile rather than the actual circumstances im-
mediately prior to the search81 in order to satisfy the exigency
requirement.
In contrast, one year after the Chambers decision, the Court held
that a warrantless search of an automobile conducted at police head-
quarters was not valid because the circumstances were not exigent."
The defendant had ample time to destroy the evidence and had no
access to the automobile at the time of the search.' A possible
distinguishing factor between this case and the Chambers case was
the time at which the probable cause developed. 4 In Chambers, prob-
able cause became apparent just prior to the vehicle being stopped. 5
In contrast, probable cause came two weeks prior to the search in
78. Id. at 44-45.
79. Id.
80. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 135-36.
81. In particular, compare the Chambers decision with the Sanders holding
that the circumstances must be exigent immediately prior to a search in order to
fall within the automobile exception:
We conclude that the state has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating
the need for warrantless searches of luggage properly taken from
automobiles. A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as
mobile as the vehicle in which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick,
the exigency of the mobility must be assessed at the point immediately
before the search-after the police have seized the object to be searched
and have it securely within their control.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 (1979). Therefore, the exigency standard is
not met unless the circumstances immediately prior to the search are exigent. In the
Chambers case, the actual circumstances were not exigent just prior to the search.
See supra note 75.
82. Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443.
83. In Coolidge, the defendant had been questioned about a murder several
times during a three week period prior to the warrantless search of his automobile.
Both he and his wife were aware that he was a suspect in the crime. Therefore, the
three week period provided ample time for the defendant or his wife to destroy the
evidence in the automobile before the vehicle was impounded. At the time of the im-
poundment and during the subsequent searches, the defendant was in police custody
and had no access to the automobile. As a result, the Court found that there were
no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search. Id.
84. For a complete discussion and supporting authority for this conclusion,
see W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 11-4 - 11-5 (1979).
See also J. HALL, JR., SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 270-71 (1982).
85. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.
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this case.' Here the Court minimized the distinction by concluding,
in adherence to Carroll, that a warrant must be procured in advance
of a search if there is sufficient time to obtain one. 7 However, the
Court has held warrantless searches to be valid where the probable
cause developed sufficiently prior to the search to obtain a warrant.8
Consequently, it is difficult to determine the maximum length of time
which must lapse before a warrant is required.
Reconciling these cases has been difficult for the courts. As a
result, the courts do not agree whether the inherent mobility of an
automobile satisfies the exigency requirement" or if each case requires
an individual analysis to determine whether the specific circumstances
result in exigency. The Supreme Court has held that the
reasonableness of a search depends upon the specific facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. 1 Yet, this statement has been confused by
subsequent inconsistent statements concluding that cars are inherently
mobile; therefore, warrantless searches are reasonable.2 It is not sur-
86. The Chambers and Coolidge cases are distinguished on the basis of the
time lapse between each search and the point in time where probable cause became
apparent:
The Coolidge plurality intimated that the Chambers decision was limited
to situations in which the probable cause to search the vehicle arises im-
mediately before or soon after the stopping of a vehicle, thereby making
it impossible to obtain a warrant prior to the stop. However, the plural-
ity concluded, when probable causes arises sufficiently in advance of the
search to permit a warrant to be obtained, failure to do so will not be
excused under Carroll.
W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 11-5 -11-6 (1979).
87. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 458-64. See also supra note 86.
88. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
89. Many courts have determined that the automobile's inherent mobility
satisfies the exigency requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637
(9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Walton, 538 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1025 (1976); United States v. Bertucci, 532 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1976); United States
v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1976).
90. Other courts have required a specific showing of exigent circumstances.
See, e.g., United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Robinson, 533 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Farnkoff, 535 F.2d 655 (lst
Cir. 1976); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
895 (1974).
91. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89 (1964); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
92. It is difficult for the courts to determine whether it is the particular cir-
cumstances surrounding the search or the inherent mobility of an automobile that
satisfies the exigency requirement as a result of statements made by the Supreme
Court such as the following:
[Wihether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of
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prising that the lower courts are unable to determine whether it is
the inherent mobility or specific circumstances that satisfy the ex-
igency requirement.' If exigency is based solely on the inherent mobili-
ty of automobiles, then warrantless searches of automobiles may be
conducted at any time there is probable cause to search. 4 This result
is clearly contrary to the Carroll ruling and fourth amendment prin-
ciples protecting reasonable expectations of privacy."
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
In addition to the theory that automobiles are inherently mobile,
the automobile exception is based upon the assumption that individuals
have a diminished expectation of privacy with regard to automobiles."
Two elements must be present to justify any legitimate expectation
of privacy. 7 First, there must be a subjective expectation of privacy.9"
Second, the expectation of privacy must be one that society is willing
to recognize as reasonable." The fourth amendment may protect what
a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public." 10 Therefore, in each warrantless search, it should be
shown that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.
the fourth amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case ... in particular, that searches of cars that are constantly moveable
may make the search of a car without a warrant a reasonable one although
the result might be the opposite in a search of a home, a store, or other
fixed piece(s) of property.
Cooper, 386 U.S. at 61.
93. See supra notes 89-90.
94. The Supreme Court in United States v. Ross concluded that a warrantless
search of an automobile, assuming probable cause, can be as extensive as a neutral
magistrate could authorize. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159 (1982).
95. "The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the [flourth
[a]mendment fades away and disappears." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 461-462. See also Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.
96. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (expectations of
privacy in automobile significantly less than in home or office); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583 (1974) (lesser expectation of privacy in automobiles because serve func-
tion of transportation not residence); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (lesser
expectation of privacy in automobiles because extensive police contact with vehicles).
97. Justice Harlan's observations of the necessary elements in a reasonable
expectation of privacy, noted in his concurring opinion in Katz, is often relied upon
by many other courts. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. (Harlan, J., concurring).
98. The person must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy in order
to meet the first requirement. Id.
99. Id.
100. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of [f]ourth [a]mendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected." Id. at 351-52.
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Expectations of privacy in automobiles
Many courts have assumed there is a lesser expectation of
privacy in automobiles (as compared to the expectations of privacy
associated with homes) without independently evaluating the specific
circumstances or assumptions upon which such a conclusion is based.''
It is true that individuals may have a lesser expectation of privacy
in automobiles because they seldom serve as a residence or repository
for personal effects.0 2 Furthermore, while serving the function of
transportation, automobiles travel public roads where both the
automobile and occupants are in the public's view." But, the Court
extends the lesser expectation of privacy rationale to the glove com-
partment and trunk of an automobile."4 This extension is made despite
the fact that neither location is within the view of the public.
Although an occupant may be in the view of the public while
riding in an automobile, the function of transportation does not ex-
tend only to the occupant. In reality, one who is traveling or using
his car for daily business often takes along personal effects that are
not within the view of others. In addition, he may have the same ex-
pectation of privacy for them as he did prior to putting the items
in the automobile."' Therefore, the fact that these items are located
in an automobile does not necessarily lead to the conclusion there is
a lesser expectation of privacy with respect to them.
To accept that a lesser expectation of privacy exists in
automobiles simply because they are a form of transportation parallels
101. See, e.g., Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (automobile exception search may be exten-
sive as magistrate can authorize); Sanders 442 U.S. 753 (expectations of privacy in
luggage greater than in automobile); Chambers, 399 U.S. 42 (lesser expectation of privacy
in automobile searched after impoundment at police headquarters); United States v.
Miller, 460 F2d 552 (10th Cir. 1972) (allowed search of mobile home with no mention
of reasonable expectations of privacy).
102. In Cardwell v. Lewis, the Supreme Court found there is a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile because it functions as transportation rather than
as a residence. In addition, automobiles travel public roads where both the automobile
and the occupants are in the public's view. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590.
103. The Supreme Court has also used the justification that the police have
extensive non-criminal contact with cars to support the lesser expectation of privacy
view. However, this view also rests on the fact that the contact is only to the extent
of what is in the public's view. See, Cady, 413 U.S. at 441-42. See also, Cardwell, 417
U.S. at 590.
104. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 366 (glove compartment); Cady, 413 U.S. at 437
(trunk).
105. See, e.g., Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977).
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the problem discussed above concerning the view that cars are in-
herently mobile and therefore warrantless searches are valid without
a showing of exigent circumstances immediately prior to the search.
Application of the lesser expectation of privacy doctrine in conjunc-
tion with the inherent mobility theory without full consideration of
the circumstances results in an automobile exception based solely on
probable cause.' 8 In addition, application of the lesser expectation of
privacy theory violates the well established principle that privacy in-
terests in automobiles are protected by the fourth amendment. 17
Expectations of privacy in containers
The fourth amendment's protection of privacy interests in
automobiles extends beyond the automobile to containers within the
vehicle. The fourth amendment protects against intrusions into
legitimate privacy interests both inside and outside the home.0 8 In
the past, the Supreme Court has protected privacy interests held with
respect to moveable opaque containers even when the containers were
located in an automobile prior to a search."0 9 However, a recent Court
decision has changed this area of the law."0
The Court in United States v. Ross,"' held that an automobile
exception search can be as "thorough as a magistrate could authorize
in a warrant.""' Since a magistrate could authorize the search of an
entire automobile and its contents, the decision extends the automobile
exception to any moveable container within the automobile at the time
of the search that might conceal the object of the search."' The scope
106. See supra notes 66-95 and accompanying text. If we assume there is a
lesser expectation of privacy in automobiles without looking to the specific cir-
cumstances, only the remaining requirements of probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances must be satisfied for a valid warrantless search. Further, if we then assume
that inherent mobility satisfies the exigency requirement, the only remaining require-
ment for a valid warrantless search is probable cause.
107. See, e.g., Sanders, 442 U.S. 753; Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443.
108. In Chadwick, the Court held that respondents manifested an expectation
of privacy in a foot locker that was double locked in the same manner as the locking
of the doors of a home to prevent intrusions manifests an expectation of privacy. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. at 13. See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 8-9.
109. Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), rev'd., 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982)
(opaque container); Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (suitcase); Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (footlocker).
110. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
111. 102 S. Ct. 2157.
112. "We hold that they may conduct a search of the vehicle that is as thorough
as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant 'particularly describing the places to
be searched'." Id. at 2159.
113. Id.
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of the search is not governed by the nature of the container that might
conceal the crime-connected materials."' Instead, the scope of the
search is governed by the locations where there is probable cause
to believe crime-connected materials are hidden."'
In Ross, officers conducted an on the street search of the defen-
dant's car. In the trunk they found a closed brown bag containing
heroine.1 During a later search of the car at police headquarters,
officers found a zippered leather pouch containing $3,200 in cash.1 17
The defendant was charged and convicted of possession of heroine
with an intent to distribute."' On appeal, the Supreme Court found
both searches valid under the automobile exception. 9 Thus, Ross ex-
tends the automobile exception, when an automobile is the subject
of a search, to all containers in the automobile that might contain
the object of the search.1 ' The Ross Court distinguished the facts of
the case from the facts in United States v. Chadwick'21 and Arkansas
v. Sanders'" where specific containers were the subject of the searches
rather than the automobiles from which the containers were
removed. 2 '
114. The Court explained the scope of the Ross ruling:
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined
by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather,
it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there
is probable cause to believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause
to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not
support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe
that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify
a warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a con-
tainer placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does
not justify a search of the entire cab.
Id. at 2172.
115. Id.
116. The officers opened the bag during the search on the street. Id. at 2160.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2159.
120. See supra note 114.
121. 433 U.S. 1.
122. 442 U.S. 753.
123. In Chadwick and Sanders, the probable cause to search was directed at
only the specific containers. But, in Ross, the vehicle itself was the subject of the
search because the officers did not know where the crime connected materials would
be located in the car. The Ross Court directly rejected the Sanders Court's reasoning
requiring a warrant to search the luggage even in cases where there is probable cause
to search the entire automobile. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2167, 2172 (overrules Robbins, 101
S. Ct. 2841); Sanders, 442 U.S. 753; Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1.
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Prior to Chadwick, most courts held that the search of moveable
opaque containers during an automobile exception search was valid.
The courts justified this because the moveable nature of the personal
effects provided sufficient exigencies to permit a warrantless search."4
However, in Chadwick the Court required a warrant prior to the
search of a double locked footlocker that had been taken from the
trunk of a car.'"
The Chadwick Court established that when luggage, such as the
double locked footlocker, has been seized and is in the exclusive con-
trol of the police there is no longer any exigency based on the mobil-
ity of the luggage.2 ' Therefore, a warrantless search was not justified
under the automobile exception."= This decision was based on a distinc-
tion between the expectations of privacy in luggage and automobiles.12"
Because luggage is a container typically used to store personal ef-
fects and the contents of luggage are "not open to public view,"''
absent exigent circumstances,"8 a valid search may be conducted only
pursuant to a valid search warrant.'' Seizure of the luggage eliminated
124. See, e.g., United States v. Hand, 497 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1974) aff d, 516
F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 953 (1976) (purses); United
States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973) (suit-
cases); United States v. Menhciz, 437 F2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974
(1971) (suitcases).
125. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1.
126. Id. at 13.
127. The Court rejected the government's argument that exigent circumstances
that existed on the scene continued to justify a search at a later time, as in automobile
searches that are conducted at the station house under the Chambers rule. Id.
128. The Court compared the expectations of privacy held with respect to lug-
gage to the expectations of privacy in an automobile. After accepting the view of the
Cardwell v. Lewis Court, supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text, the Chadwick
Court concluded that luggage has a greater expectation of privacy associated with
it. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13.
129. The Court compared the expectations of privacy in luggage with those
in an automobile:
Luggage contents are not open to public view, except as a condition to
a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject to regular
inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an automobile,
whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a
respository of personal effects. In sum, a persons' expectations of privacy
in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
130. The Court considered the immediate search of a container carrying an
explosive device to be exigent circumstances. Id.
131. Id.
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any exigent circumstances.'32 Therefore, the Court protected the ex-
pectations of privacy with respect to luggage by requiring a valid
search warrant.
133
Although it was clear that the Supreme Court was protecting
expectations of privacy in luggage in accordance with the fourth
amendment, the Chadwick decision left ambiguities that required
clarification."u In Arkansas v. Sanders,3 ' the Court took the oppor-
tunity to clarify the Chadwick decision. Under the Sanders rationale,
even if a piece of luggage is located in a moving vehicle prior to
seizure, absent exigent circumstances,13' a warrant must be obtained
prior to a valid search. 37 Neither the fourth amendment nor the
automobile exception created in Carroll supports a warrantless search
of luggage merely because it is located in an automobile. 38 For in-
stance, the fourth amendment protects reasonable expectations of
privacy with respect to luggage located in the home.3 9 It is reasonable
that a piece of luggage would be moved from the home into an
automobile for the purpose of transportation. But, it is not clear that
an individual's state of mind with respect to his expectations of privacy
in the luggage changes simply by virtue of its location. "' Specifi-
cally, one purpose of a suitcase is to prevent the public from viewing
personal items while they are transported."' One would not transport
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. In Chadwick, the Court did not clarify when a piece of luggage in an
automobile may be searched without a warrant. Therefore, it was unclear whether
it made a difference if the automobile or the container was the subject of the search.
In addition, it was not clear whether a warrant was required to search luggage if
the automobile was in motion prior to the search. See Sanders, 442 U.S. 753; Chadwuick,
433 U.S. 1.
135. 442 U.S. 753.
136. The Sanders Court said that the size of the luggage has no effect on the
exigency attached to it and therefore cannot be used to distinguish between the ex-
igencies involved with different pieces of luggage. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765. See also
note 130.
137. The Ross Court rejected this conclusion made by the Sanders Court. Ross,
102 S. Ct. at 2167, 2172.
138. In Sanders, there was probable cause to search the luggage prior to its
placement in the vehicle. The Court stated that "as a general rule there is no greater
need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from automobiles than of luggage taken
from other places." Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764. The Court then concluded that there
is "no justification for the extension of Carroll and its progeny to the warrantless
search of one's personal luggage merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully
stopped by police." Id.
139. Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
140. See supra note 138.
141. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762.
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in open view what he would put in luggage if the transportation were
in something other than an automobile."'
In addition to analyzing expectations of privacy with regard to
luggage seized from automobiles, the Sanders Court evaluated the ele-
ment of exigent circumstances required by the automobile exception.
The Court concluded that once the luggage has been seized during
an automobile search and is under the exclusive control of the police,
"its mobility is in no way affected by the place from which it was
taken."'" Therefore, the Sanders Court recognized that the need to
conduct a warrantless search is no greater when luggage is taken
from an automobile than from any other place. "
The Chadwick and Sanders rulings seem clear; however applica-
tion of the rule to searches of containers within automobiles is
difficult.' The difficult aspect of applying the rule is determining what
containers are considered repositories of personal effects that com-
mand a reasonable expectation of privacy.'" Courts have required war-
rants to search briefcases,'47 backpacks,1 some paper bags,'4 9 a purse,"5
and a shaving kit. 5 ' In contrast, warrantless searches of plastic and
142. "One is not less inclined to place private, personal possessions in a suit-
case merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather than
transported by other means or temporarily checked or stored." Id. at 764.
143. Id. at 763. See also supra note 138.
144. See supra note 138.
145. The difficulty arises from the following passage:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a
search will deserve full protection of the [f]ourth [almendment. Thus, some
containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very
nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their
contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some
cases the contents of a package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby ob-
viating the need for a warrant. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234,
236 (per curiam). There will be difficulties in determining which parcels
taken from an automobile require a warrant for their search and which
do not. Our decision in this case means only that a warrant generally
is required before personal luggage can be searched and that the extent
to which the [f]ourth [a]mendment applies to containers and other parcels
depends not at all upon whether they are seized from an automobile.
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65.
146. Id.
147. State v. Groda, 591 P.2d 1354 (Ore. 1979).
148. United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1979); People v. Min-
jares, 591 P.2d 514 (Cal. 1979).
149. Robbins, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
150. People v. Redmond, 73 Ill. App. 3d 160, 390 N.E.2d 1364 (1979).
151. Moore v. State, 594 S.W.2d 245 (Ark. 1980).
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burlap bags,'52 paper bags," and a cardboard box" have been held
valid.
The Supreme Court finally clarified the question of which con-
tainers have fourth amendment protection by recognizing that there
should be no distinction between different types of opaque containers
that might carry personal effects.115 Because there is no objective
criteria by which to distinguish between containers, all opaque con-
tainers are given the same amount of fourth amendment protection."
Therefore, the fourth amendment principles concerning reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy must be applied to all opaque containers in deter-
mining whether a warrantless search is valid."7
The Ross Court accepted the view that all opaque containers
should be treated alike under the fourth amendment." However, the
Court gave minimal consideration to the expectations of privacy at-
tached to the paper bag and zippered pouch in determining that a
warrant was unnecessary to search them.' It merely concluded that
the expectations of privacy in a trunk or glove compartment may be
no less than those in moveable container."' But, this conclusion is
premised upon the assumption that a person actually has a diminished
expectation of privacy with regard to containers in an automobile.''
The Ross Court supported its holding by suggesting that the
search in Carroll, which included tearing open the seat cushions to
find the contraband within, was the search that a magistrate could
152. United States v. Firclin, 570 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1978).
153. United States v. Jimenez, 626 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980); Clark v. State, 574
P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1978).
154. United States v. Newmann, 585 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1978).
155. However, the Court made it clear that if the outward appearance of the
container makes the contents obvious, (such as clear plastic bag or a kit of burglar
tools) no warrant is necessary for a valid search. A container that leaves its contents
in open view or easily inferrable from the outward appearance has no reasonable ex-
pectation or privacy associated with it. No fourth amendment protection is given to
an item unless there is a reasonable expectation of privacy associated with the item.
Robbins, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (supported by Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157).
156. Id. Thus, there is no distinction for fourth amendment purposes between
suitcases and paper bags on the basis of the container's worthiness.
157. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
158. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157.
159. Id.
160. The Ross dissent recognized the expectations of privacy aspect of the fourth
amendment protection given to personal effects. Id. at 2173-82.
161. See supra notes 101-73 and accompanying text.
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authorize."' Therefore, the scope of an automobile search should be
limited only to what a magistrate could authorize."3 The Ross Court
pointed out that rarely would contraband be strewn throughout an
automobile because the nature of the goods would dictate they be
withheld from public view.' As a result, the Court concludes that
to hold that containers cannot be searched under the automobile ex-
ception would nullify the Carroll holding
16 5
However, it is not clear from Carroll that the Court would not,
as in Chadwick and Sanders, have protected containers that command
a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Carroll Court was not con-
fronted with the search of a moveable container, but was confronted
instead with a search of the vehicle itself. ' Since the Court did not
even discuss reasonable expectations of privacy with respect to
automobiles, but instead based its decision on the exigency standard,
it is not clear that the Carroll Court even contemplated the Ross
result.' The Ross Court essentially based its conclusion on a stan-
dard never previously stated by the Court. Thus, the exigency ra-
tionale extends to items that in any location other than a vehicle would
have full fourth amendment protection. 6
In order to arrive at this conclusion, the Ross Court ignores
162. The Court supported the Ross decision by analogizing the holding to the
Carroll holding:
Having stopped Carroll and Kiro on a public road and subjected them
to the indignity of a vehicle search-which the Court found to be a
reasonable intrusion on their privacy because it was based on probable
cause that their vehicle was transporting contraband-prohibition agents
were entitled to tear open a portion of the roadster itself. The scope of
the search was no greater than a magistrate could have authorized by
issuing a warrant based on the probable cause that justified the search.
Since such a warrant could have authorized the agents to open the rear
portion of the roadster and to rip the upholstery in their search for con-
cealed whiskey, the search was constitutionally permissible.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2169.
163. Id.
164. "Contraband goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car;
since by their very nature such goods must be withheld from public view, they rarely
can be placed in an automobile unless they are enclosed within some form of con-
tainer." Id. at 2170.
165. Id,
166. See Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.
167. See supra note 63.
168. The Court held in Terry v. Ohio that personal effects have fourth amend-
ment protection both inside and outside the home. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8-9.
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reasonable expectations of privacy associated with opaque containers."6 9
Because the argument suggesting warrantless opaque container
searches are invalid was never raised until Chadwick, the Ross Court
reasoned that it was understood that such containers could be searched
under Carroll.7 ' One possible reason for the absence of this argument
is that most container searches prior to Chadwick, that came before
the Supreme Court, involved containers that made their contents ob-
vious, such as the whiskey bags in Carroll.7' These packages are not
typically used to store personal items. In contrast, the question was
raised in Chadwick where the container searched was a piece of lug-
gage; a typical repository for personal effects.17' The fact that the argu-
ment was not raised until Chadwick is no justification for ignoring
reasonable expectations of privacy associated with opaque containers.
Prior to the Ross decision, each case discussed in this note has
given to the law enforcement officers conducting valid warrantless
automobile searches the duty of judging probable cause, which is or-
dinarily that of a neutral magistrate. But no court has gone as far
as the Ross Court in ruling that an automobile search, assuming prob-
able cause, can be as broad as a magistrate can authorize. The
Supreme Court ignores fourth amendment principles requiring the
judgment of a neutral magistrate and protecting reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy in order to achieve the Ross result.'7' When balanc-
ing the actual exigencies involved with respect to the expectations
of privacy and the general requirement for a warrant, it is clear that
the warrant requirement has taken a back seat as a result of the Ross
decision.
169. See Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2173-82. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2169.
171. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (liquor containers, unstamped);
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (liquor of particular description given by
an informant); Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (whiskey bags).
172. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1.
173. The dissent in Ross noted that the Court ignored the fourth amendment
requirement of a neutral magistrate:
The majority today not only repeals all realistic limits on warrantless
automobiles searches, it repeals the [flourth [almendment warrant require-
ment itself. By equating a police officer's estimation of probable cause
with a magistrate's, the Court utterly disregards the value of neutral and
detached magistrate . . . The new rule adopted by the Court today is
completely incompatible with established [flourth [a]mendment principles,
and takes a first step toward an unprecedented "probable cause" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. In my view under accepted standards,
the warrantless search of the container in this case clearly violates the
[f]ourth [a]mendment.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2173-74 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).




It is possible to provide fourth amendment protection for
automobile searches without incurring the risk of losing evidence that
the automobile exception was intended to eliminate. Instead of apply-
ing the automobile exception to vehicle searches, a warrant should
be required to search all automobiles except where the individuals
involved intelligently and voluntarily choose to allow a warrantless
search,'74 or where circumstances are actually exigent. Where an in-
dividual does not voluntarily allow a search, seizure of the automobile
is necessary while a warrant is being secured. If it is determined that
probable cause did not exist in a case where an individual chose to
allow an immediate search, the search is invalid. Any evidence ob-
tained during the illegal search is not admissible at trial. This alter-
native would allow those involved the opportunity to choose which
intrusion is least offensive to them'75 with reassurance that voluntarily
allowing a search will not cause them to forfeit their fourth amend-
ment rights.
In an effort to determine which is the greater intrusion, an im-
mediate search or a seizure of a vehicle, the majority of the Court
in Chambers v. Maroney7' balanced the invasions of each alternative
against the invasion upon an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy.'77 The Court concluded that the invasions were constitutionally
equal.' Therefore either course is reasonable under the fourth
amendment.79 Thus, it is not unreasonable to require seizure of an
automobile until a warrant can be obtained as an alternative to an
immediate search of the automobile. This alternative provides full
fourth amendment protection to privacy interests. One who prefers
174. As Justice Harlan noted, there are circumstances where seizure of an
automobile may be more offensive to an occupant than an immediate search. Chambers,
399 U.S. at 64. However, an occupant has the option of allowing an immediate search
thereby avoiding any delay. Id.
175. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2173-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
177. Id. at 52.
178. In determining that the intrusions were equal, the Court ignored the par-
ticular facts of each case. In Chambers, the car was seized and brought to the station.
This is fairly standard practice when a person is arrested near his vehicle. As a result,
even if the car had been searched at the scene or if there was no interest in searching
the car, such a seizure could be expected. Here, the owner of the automobile was
arrested and in no position to reclaim the car during the necessary time required
to obtain a warrant. In addition, there was no evidence that any third party wanted
to reclaim the car. Therefore, there would have been no greater intrusion here had
the car been held while a warrant was obtained. Id- at 51-52.
179. Id.
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to protect his expectations of privacy may choose that the automobile
be seized until a warrant is obtained.
For the purpose of protecting expectations of privacy, at least
one court has required that an automobile be guarded while a war-
rant is being obtained to search it.8 ° Although the inconvenience' of
guarding an automobile would be present in most cases, it has no
constitutional significance.' Therefore, it is not unreasonable to re-
quire officers to guard an automobile during the time necessary to
obtain a warrant.
Only in extreme cases where circumstances are actually exigent
will warrantless searches of automobiles be valid without those in-
volved voluntarily choosing an immediate search. An example of this
type of case would be where one officer stops an automobile carrying
several people and he is unable to receive additional help in order
to obtain a warrant, detain the individuals, and guard the automobile.
Mere inconvenience to the officer will not be sufficient to make the
circumstances exigent. The officer must not be able to obtain a war-
rant without an actual threat of losing the evidence.
The threat of losing the evidence is not present with regard to
opaque containers within the vehicle. Therefore, during an automobile
search based on exigent circumstances, the officer must seize the con-
tainer and obtain a warrant prior to a valid search. Only where there
is- probable cause to believe the contents of the containers create ex-
igent circumstances, such as the danger posed by explosives, will a
warrantless search of an opaque container be valid. This requirement
is consistent with the Supreme Court's finding that the intrusion of
an immediate warrentless search of luggage is greater than the in-
trusion of detaining luggage while obtaining a warrant.' The Court
held in Sanders and Chadwick that an immediate search of luggage,
as the greater intrusion upon privacy compared to seizure of the lug-
gage, is inherently unreasonable.'3 Thus, the lesser intrusion of seiz-
ing opaque containers until a warrant is obtained to search them is
required, absent actual exigent circumstances.
The solution proposed here not only protects reasonable expec-
tations of privacy associated with containers within automobiles but
180. United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
895 (1974).
181. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
182. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753; Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1.
183. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762-66; Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
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also protects reasonable expectations of privacy held with respect to
the automobiles themselves. Because the intrusion involved in seiz-
ing an automobile is constitutionally equal to the intrusion of search-
ing the automobile without a warrant, fourth amendment protection
is best served by allowing the individuals to choose which intrusion
is least offensive to them. Only where circumstances are actually ex-
igent should the fourth amendment warrant requirement yield to the
need for law enforcement.
CONCLUSION
The results in many warrantless automobile cases indicate a con-
cern of the Court that the job of law enforcement be made less
difficult.'" When the automobile exception was created in the Carroll
case, the Court noted that the decision was "a wise one because it
leaves the rule one which is easily applied and understood and is
uniform.1 ' 8 5 However, the fourth amendment protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.'86 It does not purport to make
this an easy task."' In addition, it does not suggest that a clear inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment has more value than fourth amend-
ment interests protecting reasonable expectations of privacy.'8
Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurrence to Sanders that
"we are construing the constitution, not writing a statute or a manual
for law enforcement officers."'89 As discussed earlier, mere inconven-
ience to law enforcement agents does not make circumstances
exigent.' ° In fact, Carroll specifically stated that a warrant must be
obtained when practical.' But the courts that have allowed searches
of automobiles after seizure and impoundment at police headquarters
have ignored this holding in Carroll.'92
The Ross Court made an extensive effort to achieve a clear stan-
dard in spite of fourth amendment principles protecting expectations
of privacy'9 3 and requiring neutral magistrates to issue warrants.'9'
184. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2161-62.
185. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 159.
186. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
187. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
188. See supra note 1.
189. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 768.
190. See, e.g., Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393; Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097.
191. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156.
192. Chambers, 399 U.S. 42.
193. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157; See also supra notes 96-173 and accompanying text.
194. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157; See also supra note 38-54.
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In fact, the Court granted certiorari for the purpose of clarifying the
law on automobile exception searches.19 Unfortunately this goal
resulted in the Supreme Court ignoring highly valued fourth amend-
ment principles.
SUSAN E. KELLY
195. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2161-62.
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